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Data retention, journalist freedoms and whistleblowers 
The digital networked structures of the internet and mobile communications have provided 
extraordinary opportunities for the opening out of debates and the creation of public spheres 
previously not possible, but there has also been an increase in surveillance that puts the issue of 
freedom of expression in question. The role of journalists in these debates remains an important 
one, despite the apparent democratisation of information made possible by the internet, as 
journalists can provide an essential conduit between news sources and the public sphere. As 
members of the ‘fourth estate’ journalists have enjoyed certain limited protections for themselves 
and their sources under the laws of various countries. These protections are now uniquely 
challenged in the context of metadata retention and enhanced surveillance and national security 
protections.  
In the Australian context, a number of laws have been passed in the last several years that are of 
concern and are the focus of this paper. However, it is worth noting, by way of background, that the 
fourth estate has historically been constrained by the Australian regulatory context. In the first 
instance, the Australian media has been seen as somewhat compromised by the concentration of 
media ownership, which has led to a lack of diversity in coverage, and the pursuit of the particular 
agendas of the owners (Pusey and McCutcheon 2011:22). Murdoch, Packer and Fairfax news 
organisations have historically dominated the media landscape, and in recent times, cross media 
ownership regulations designed to preserve the already somewhat limited diversity of the Australian 
media landscape have been relaxed (Broadcasting Services Amendment (Media Ownership) Act 
2006 and the Broadcasting Legislation Amendment (Media Reform Bill) 2016 under consideration. 
See also Given 2007). In addition, Australian defamation laws are much stricter than their US and UK 
equivalents, with high payouts to plaintiffs particularly in New South Wales, discouraging critique of 
public figures and suppressing robust journalism. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) imposes harsh penalties 
on Commonwealth Government employees who disclose information that they have obtained in the 
course of their official duties to anyone outside of those duties.  Further, the Australian Government 
itself has even resorted to copyright laws in order to prevent publication and analysis of official 
documents (Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39). Thus the current raft of 
legislation comes on top of some already concerning constraints on media freedoms and the ability 
of journalists to pursue investigative and watchdog reporting. 
 
In 2015 the Australian Federal Government passed a new data retention bill obliging ISPs to retain 
metadata of their customers’ activities for two years and to make that metadata available to 
government agencies under what some would say are very lax conditions. The warrantless access to 
citizens’ internet and phone metadata is mitigated in the case of journalists. Here the government 
has introduced some curious warrant mechanisms that purport to act as a check on the power of the 
security agencies. At risk is the journalists’ ability to assure confidentiality to their sources as, when 
security agencies access their metadata they can, through evidence or inference, identify journalists’ 
contact with whistleblowers. Further legislation under the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) Act criminalises the journalist who publishes any material relating to ‘Special 
Intelligence Operations’ with a threat of 5 -10 years imprisonment. Other laws constrain 
professionals (such as doctors and counsellors) from speaking out about conditions in off-shore 
detention centres for asylum seekers (Border Force Act). Whistleblower laws offer the very 
narrowest of protections and essentially criminalise most whistleblower actions, whether they prove 
to be in the public interest or not.  
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 This paper will explore the new legislation affecting journalists, journalists’ responses to it, as well as 
considering the implications in the broader context of discourses of national security. The 
‘necessary’ trade-offs between democratic freedoms and safety suggested by these discourses 
indicate a growing willingness of the Australian government to incrementally assign itself more 
power with less accountability in the name of national security. The paper will consider the position 
of the mainstream media in relation to government, but also in relation to the increasingly complex 
world of networked journalism, where non-institutional actors play a role in revealing what the 
mainstream media may choose to, or be forced to, suppress.  It is observed that some of these 
developments are out of step with developments in other jurisdictions with respect to retention and 
access to metadata, such as in the EU under the European Court of Justice’s 2014 declaration 
regarding the invalidity of the Data Protection Directive of 2006. Even the US may have greater 
checks and balances upon the operation of equivalent laws, with the role of the First and Fourth 
Amendments. No such protections or limitations apply under Australian Constitutional Law. In 
Australia there is only an implied freedom of communication concerning government and political 
matters (Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520). 
If we consider that the government, corporations, the media and citizens each have a certain power 
to scrutinise the others, we can see that when these abilities to scrutinise and be subject to scrutiny 
are held in balance, it can result in a functioning democracy – each arm playing a role in holding the 
others accountable for their actions. However, the health of the democracy is at risk if this 
dynamically held tension goes out of balance. When government increases surveillance of its citizens 
and at the same time reduces its own accountability through making more of its workings secret 
there is cause for concern. Add to this that the government increasingly relies on partnerships with 
corporations to gather data and to carry out its surveillance activities and the balance can seem even 
further out of alignment. What role can the press and non-institutional actors and citizens take in 
the face of this insidious creep towards a lack of transparency? We acknowledge the importance of 
public spheres and conversations generated through social media platforms but the role of 
algorithmically created news feeds in social media, and the responsibility of platforms as media 
organisations requires a separate paper. 
 
The Laws 
There have been a number of different pieces of legislation passed in Australia over the last few 
years that have added to the government’s power to scrutinise the population and cloak its activities 
in secrecy. These include the metadata retention laws passed in 2015, section 35P of the ASIO Act, 
the Border Force Act, and some very restrictive whistleblower legislation (which could not be 
dignified with the term ‘protection’). These will be briefly canvassed below to give a sense of the 
general legal context in which journalists are acting.  
The meta data retention law enacted by the Australian Commonwealth Government, 
(Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015) requires 
Telecommunications Providers to retain customer metadata for two years for law enforcement and 
security purposes. It enables warrantless access to this metadata for a range of government agencies 
(21 in all). The metadata does not include the content of communications but, as has been pointed 
out numerous times, the information contained in metadata is rich enough to be the basis of 
securing convictions of whistleblowers and is even the basis on which the US kills people (with drone 
strikes for instance) as asserted by the former head of the NSA and CIA Michael Hayden (Cole et al., 
2014. See also Scahill, 2016). Metadata includes telephone numbers called and received from, the 
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time and length of calls, the location of the parties making calls, the IP addresses of computers from 
which messages are received or sent, email addresses of messages (to and from), various chat site 
data, the location of individuals involved in the communications and the names of applications used, 
and so on.  
The government has been at pains to employ a discourse which insists that, because the content of 
communication is not looked at, there is nothing for citizens to worry about. Metadata collection, 
they argue, is not an invasion of privacy and can’t tell them much at all. Disclaimers of the, by now 
rather tired “if you’ve got nothing to hide you’ve got nothing to fear” variety, belie the level of 
information contained in metadata and the inferences that are routinely made from it. Metadata is 
in fact a messy, opaque and invisible layer of data we give off in our communications (Ganesh and 
Hankey, 2015). It is used in equally opaque fashion by both corporations and governments. It is hard 
to understand what levels of privacy Australians can achieve in the face of metadata collection. 
Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian Prime Minister who several years earlier, while his party was in 
opposition, had advocated strongly against metadata retention laws (Turnbull, 2012), suggesting 
they were an incursion into peoples’ privacy and an “attempt to restrain free speech”, oversaw the 
passing and implementation of the new laws once he was in government. He also suggested, in a 
confusingly contradictory way, that people should be encrypting their communications anyway, as 
he does himself (Grubb, 2015). Ultimately the bipartisan support for the metadata retention laws 
suggests that there will be few changes in the near future to this new set of powers taken by the 
government and its policing and security agencies. Of concern in this paper is the way in which it 
jeopardises the ability of journalists to maintain the confidentiality of their sources.  
This issue was the minor controversy that (briefly) held up the passage of the new law. An 
amendment was accepted that created a warrant process for accessing journalists’ metadata. Under 
these provisions, agencies are prohibited from authorising the disclosure of journalists’ or their 
employers’ telecommunications data for the purposes of identifying a “source” without a Journalist 
Information Warrant. This Journalist Information Warrant however, is a curious, secretive and 
probably ineffective process if a journalist is concerned about protecting sources. A warrant can be 
sought by any one of 21 government agencies, by application to an “Issuing Authority”, an 
appointment from judges of the Federal Court or Administrative Appeals Tribunal (or to the 
Attorney-General in the case of ASIO) who must be satisfied that the ‘public interest in issuing the 
warrant outweighs the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of the identity of the source’ 
having regard to a number of factors. The journalist is never told about the application and cannot 
speak to the court on his or her own behalf as to why the application should not be granted. Instead 
the Prime Minister appoints a “Public Interest Advocate” who speaks on behalf of the public 
interest. These government appointed advocates (currently two former judges) are under no 
obligation to champion the journalist’s position, and may never take the point of view of the 
journalist or advocate on their behalf. We will never know, because the process is held in secret and 
anyone revealing the existence of the warrant application or the result of it faces penalties of up to 2 
years imprisonment. In this way the journalist will never know whether their metadata has been 
accessed by security agencies and nor will we. The take home message is that any source who has 
contacted a journalist electronically either by phone or internet, without stringent encryption 
measures which encrypt metadata (a difficult process requiring some skill and effort) will not be 
guaranteed confidentiality. If they met in a café and had their phones with them, they can be linked 
through GPS metadata. If there was any email contact or phone contact, they are compromised. This 
regime is added to a system which is already known to be somewhat leaky, with data being accessed 
for illegal purposes in various government agencies over time. The addition of so much more data 
available to so many agencies is troubling. 
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Section 35P of the ASIO Act, a further piece of legislation introduced in 2014 criminalises the act of 
reporting on any Special Intelligence Operation (SIO) being carried out by ASIO. A ‘Special 
Intelligence Operation’ is an operation in relation to which a special intelligence operation authority 
has been granted. It is carried out for a purpose relevant to the performance of one or more special 
intelligence functions (s 4). Special Intelligence Operations are authorized illegal actions carried out 
by ASIO. They grant broad immunities with respect to criminal liability for agents’ conduct during the 
operations. They are secret operations and s35P makes it a crime to disclose any information 
relating to an SIO, now or in the future, anywhere, even if the information is currently already in the 
public domain. As ASIO consistently refuses to comment on any “Operational Matters”, and as the 
SIOs are secret, it is almost impossible to know whether information a journalist wishes to publish is 
in fact part of an SIO. This creates a great deal of uncertainty, as is pointed out in the Gyles Report of 
2015. This report, commissioned by the Prime Minister from the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor to assess the impact of section 35P on journalist freedoms, criticizes the section 
on a number of fronts.  
Gyles suggests there are two areas of concern. Firstly that the uncertainty as to what may be 
published about ASIO creates a chilling effect that is detrimental to the constitutionally implied right 
to freedom of communication. Secondly the provision prohibits the disclosure of information, 
“regardless of whether it has any, or continuing, operational significance and even if it discloses 
reprehensible conduct by ASIO insiders.”(Gyles, 2015). The report suggested a number of changes be 
made to the Act and the government agreed in February 2016 to implement the recommendations 
of the Gyles Report, but has yet to do so. The changes create a number of more nuanced distinctions 
between ‘insiders’ to ASIO and ‘outsiders’ (meaning journalists) and make for slightly less 
uncertainty around what may be published. Another recommendation is that publication can take 
place if the information is already in the public domain (however it seems that the first to put it in 
the public domain can still be punished) and also that inadvertent disclosure when not aware of the 
SIO will not be criminalised. However the basic intent of the section – to pursue whistleblowers and 
deter journalists with criminal penalties remains and its intent to chill freedom of speech around 
ASIO and security operations and the five-ten year imprisonment penalties also remain. The 
journalists’ union (the MEAA) is not satisfied with the outcome and suggests that it still criminalises 
journalists for doing their job and that “Section 35P seeks to stifle or punish legitimate public 
interest journalism.”(Murphy, 2016) 
The process of the implementation and review of s35P is a source of both optimism and pessimism. 
On the one hand, the review process by the independent monitor can be seen to be working, at least 
to some extent. On the other hand, while the government has said it will make some adjustments, 
the intent of s35P to criminalise both whistleblowers and the journalists they disclose to, remains a 
cause for concern. The recommended amendments make the legislation only slightly less 
concerning. 
The Border Force Act 2015 (Cth) is a further piece of legislation which has a secrecy provision 
(section 42) which prohibits “entrusted persons” (such as doctors, counsellors, detention centre 
employees, etc) from revealing “protected information” (which means information that was 
obtained by a person in the person's capacity as an entrusted person). There is a penalty of up to 2 
years imprisonment. It follows on years of policies made with bipartisan support that have seen 
asylum seekers held in indefinite detention despite international law obligations, and journalists 
denied access to the detention centres. The Border Force Act can be seen as a law aimed at closing 
down whistleblowers and creating a chilling effect on freedom of expression. In relation to the 
Australian offshore detention centres, it creates a great deal of uncertainty about what professionals 
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employed, either directly or through contracts with companies operating the services on behalf of 
the government, are able to disclose without fear of reprisal. Doctors have protested that they are 
obligated to report abuse under their professional standards, but have been silenced by the heavy 
handed approach of the Border Force Act. The Guardian Australia reported that doctors have had 
their phone records accessed and one was sacked after speaking out about conditions in the 
detention centres (Doherty, 2016). A group of doctors are challenging section 42 in the High Court at 
the time of writing.   
The final area of legislation to mention in this context is the laws pertaining to whistleblowers. 
There are existing laws under the criminal code that pertain to terrorism, treason, espionage and so 
on. There are offences under the Crimes Act such as Section 70 which restricts disclosure of 
information by current and former Commonwealth officers, and the communication of official 
secrets, even to Members of Parliament. This was the law under which Allan Robert Kessing was 
convicted in 2007 after allegedly revealing information contained in his own report about corruption 
in the Customs Department that led to an investigation of airport security and an allocation of more 
than $200m to address the identified problems (Vaughn, 2012). The exposure of misconduct 
ultimately worked very much in the interest of national security and public safety. Kessing, it should 
be noted, was convicted on the basis of metadata – a phone call was made from a public phone box 
near his home to a media organisation (Coulthart, 2015). The fact that the government pursued 
Kessing and that he was convicted on the basis of metadata rather than any actual evidence of 
content being disclosed is a telling indication of the government’s attitude to whistleblowers and 
metadata. Although the whistleblower may be doing exactly the right thing by revealing information 
vital to the public interest, the desire to discourage any whistleblower action can be seen to 
motivate government actions.  
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) which is intended to ‘promote the integrity and 
accountability of the Commonwealth public sector’ is the government’s whistleblower ‘protection’ 
law. It is very restrictive in what it considers legitimate disclosure and includes elements such as 
having to disclose within the organisation first (always a problem if trying to report on corruption or 
misconduct of senior management within organisations) and that the person must be a current 
Commonwealth Government employee – often whistleblowers only feel safe to disclose information 
after they have left an organisation. It also defines a narrow range of issues around which 
disclosures can be made. It could be argued that it offers very little protection to whistleblowers and 
probably acts more as a discouragement than an incentive to call out misconduct and corruption. 
Added to this law is the patchwork of laws that exist in States and Territories as well as corporate 
whistleblower laws and policies, all of which serves to create confusion over the nuances of which 
law might apply to people wishing to expose misconduct.   
 
Journalists’ responses 
A number of journalists have made public statements about the laws as they have passed, and the 
Journalists’ union, the MEAA has made some very strongly worded protests as well. In the foreword 
to the MEAA report “Criminalising the truth, suppressing the right to know”(MEAA, 2016) Paul 
Murphy suggests  
In just a few short years, Australia has fallen from being a bastion of press freedom to a 
country that has passed a raft of national security laws that allow government agencies to 
pursue journalists and their sources and criminalises legitimate journalism in the public 
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interest. Increasingly, governments are denying the public’s right to know and moves are 
underway to deny information from becoming public. (p4) 
As journalist Ross Coulthart put it “I suspect the metadata laws are part of an opportunistic push by 
our police and intelligence services to use the current national security crisis to try to shut the door 
on journalistic investigation into their activities.” (Coulthart 2105 NP). Coulthart argues that the 
pursuit of whistleblowers in such a punitive fashion as the new laws allow often has nothing to do 
with national security and everything to do with the government trying to save itself from further 
embarrassments. Many of the whistleblower cases where public servants expose government 
incompetence or corruption, such as the Kessing case mentioned earlier, actually seek to expose 
existing public safety risks, rather than themselves constituting threats to national security. The 
definition of security is seemingly broad and elastic. The chilling effect seems intentional. Coulthart 
mentions one example of a potential whistleblower from an immigration detention centre who 
approached him with material evidence of young boys being raped by men in the facility. But 
because the source had rung him, he had to warn him that he could go to prison if traced through 
the metadata. The source withdrew his offer, “and that’s why metadata is killing investigative 
journalism.” (Coulthart, 2015: np) 
Sydney journalist Ben Grubb made a very public case of his attempts to gain access to his own 
metadata from his telecommunications provider Telstra over a period of several years. His long 
running battle through the courts highlighted the fact that agencies such as the RSPCA (Royal Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) could access his metadata but he could not. The courts 
eventually held that he should be able to access at least some of his metadata (Grubb, 2014), but 
this was later overturned in the Court of Administrative Appeals. The arguments in this case were 
about whether metadata was personal information and go to the heart of privacy arguments. The 
appeal that Telstra won essentially discarded the initial finding that metadata, because it is used in 
conjunction with other streams of data constitutes personally identifiable information. In the appeal, 
the court overturned this by only recognizing the metadata as signals data ‘about’ the devices and 
addresses of messages, not ‘about’ the user. It would seem then, that despite the fact that metadata 
is constantly used to identify people by cross matching it with other metadata, the court would only 
be prepared to recognize it as signals information in isolation, rather than as information with 
multiple uses and functions.  
The point of trying to follow these cases is that we can glean some indication about how courts 
might look upon future arguments around metadata. The refusal to acknowledge the functional use 
of metadata to identify people does not bode well for arguments that the government should not be 
accessing that metadata on the basis of privacy concerns. But of course journalists have a much 
more urgent concern about the protection of their sources.  The journalist information warrants 
seem an ineffective measure of protection. Commentary on these warrants from Day and Molnar in 
The Conversation suggests “the current manifestation of warrant requirements for journalists in 
Australia’s data retention scheme would actually do little to meaningfully defend press freedoms” 
(Day and Molnar, 2015). It is characterized as a rather easy hurdle for security agencies to 
circumvent and one we are not likely to know the effectiveness of. They suggest that in the US the 
model for security agencies accessing journalist data at least allows journalists to represent 
themselves and their interests in court – they know about the warrants and they are able to defend 
the integrity of their sources in a court. In Australia, Laurie Oakes pointed out that:  
There will be Public Interest Advocates — lawyers appointed by the government — able to 
contest warrant applications, but they won’t be standing in the shoes of journalists or media 
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organisations. In fact, the Attorney-General’s Department says candidly that there will be 
times when the advocates will support issuing a warrant. (2016:8) 
The ability of a journalist to protect their sources in the digital age is compromised on many fronts, 
including through metadata, GPS data, CCTV and phone data (Pearson, 2015). Journalist Jonathon 
Stern suggests many journalists are ill-prepared when it comes to understanding how to protect 
their sources in the digital age. He points out how easy it is to endanger a source by careless actions 
carried out in ignorance (Holmes, 2015). Understanding how metadata is captured and how the 
technologies  of encryption work is one part of the problem. However another part of the problem is 
in understanding the legal territory. Here the chilling effect is probably of greatest concern. In a 
study done on journalists’ understanding of shield laws in Australia it was found that most of the 
journalists surveyed were ignorant about the protections actually offered by shield laws and also 
that they had little idea about data retention laws or how to go about keeping sources secure 
(Fernandez and Pearson, 2015). In the face of this uncertainty the result is often a chilling effect on 
speech. The complexity of the legal territory was already a factor before the latest security laws 
were introduced. In considering the counter-terrorism laws in place around 2007, McNamara (2009) 
concluded that the legal framework was so complex that it created uncertainty that almost certainly 
has a chilling effect. He suggests that there is discursive deployment of risk and security by 
authorities which attempts to control the flow of information beyond the legal limits available to the 
government. Thus control is exerted in the shadow of the law. The secrecy which surrounds many of 
the processes makes it difficult to determine the actual direct effects of any interventions which may 
occur (McNamara, 2009). Ruby et al sargue that “State control via new security legislationhas been 
central to discouraging journalism” {Ruby, 2016 #805} 
A further question that arises for journalists from the current laws is about who is actually defined as 
a journalist under the law. As Gyles (2016) pointed out in his report on s35P, the definition of 
journalist varies between a number of different legal frameworks. Some laws such as shield laws in 
the Evidence Act adopted a broad definition that included bloggers, tweeters, and aggregators as 
well as a variety of mediums of publication, although this was narrowed in an amendment in 2010. 
Shield laws under the Broadcasting Services Act adopt a narrower definition which restricts the 
category to people employed professionally by media organisations. He also points to variations 
between Federal and State laws. The status of freelancers and professional journalists who are self-
employed remains a grey area, which Gyles doesn’t attempt to clear up. Thus digital media can be 
seen to have ushered in not only the possibilities and risks of metadata and surveillance but also 
uncertainty about who actually qualifies as a journalist under the variety of laws that offer 
protections and punishments to journalists. The low barriers to entry for publishing online and the 
rise of citizen journalism practices create further uncertainty in this area. 
 
The commercial media – balancing roles? 
Laurie Oakes, a well-known senior journalist who works variously for television and newspaper 
outlets, gave a speech to the Melbourne Press Freedom Australia dinner in 2015 in which he 
addressed the issues arising from the current tranche of security laws discussed above. One of his 
key points was that Australian journalists essentially dropped the ball in responding in a timely 
fashion to the legislation. He suggests that the media have been complacent and as a result these 
laws have been passed with little protest from journalists (Oakes, 2016).  He suggests “We were too 
slow to recognize the threat. Too late, and probably too polite in pushing back.” (Oakes 2016:6) It is 
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to this issue of the level of vigor with which the press in Australia have been pursuing investigative 
journalism that we want to turn to now. 
In the balancing act between government, corporations, the press and citizens mentioned at the 
start of this paper, we noted that the government is increasingly partnering with commercial 
organisations in matters of security and data gathering. Journalists in the commercial press face a 
number of dilemmas in relation to their ability to scrutinize the government and its actions. The first, 
as alluded to above, is that the established media institutions have become complacent about their 
scrutiny. Reporters often rely on friendly relationships with government bureaucrats and politicians 
to keep the channels of information flowing. It has been pointed out that the press are sometimes 
reluctant to criticize or expose the government for fear of losing access to those flows of information 
that they otherwise rely on (Andrejevic 2014). The complicity of the mainstream media in supporting 
government agendas has been commented on from a number of fronts. Matthew Rickertson (2013), 
who assisted in the Finkelstein report into Media integrity in Australia in 2012, asserts that 
“important public policy discussions were being distorted or ignored by much of the mainstream 
news media” (Rickertson, 2013: 150). Andrejevic (2014) similarly points to the failings of the US 
mainstream media in their job as watchdogs of government. He suggests there has been a “dramatic 
failure of conventional channels for challenging power or holding it accountable.” (Andrejevic, 2014: 
2624) and that “[t]he established system for challenging power has conceded its own dysfunction” 
(2014:2625) when both the Washington Post and The New York Times apologized for not properly 
investigating and reporting on the Iraq weapons of mass destruction stories that led to the US 
invasion of Iraq. Benkler (2011) also points to the cozy relationship between the US government and 
the mainstream press, and the ways in which the government partners with commercial 
organisations which may in turn also have strong links with media organisations. The general point 
being that there are a range of disincentives for mainstream commercial media to engage in critique 
of government policies.  
Alongside this perceived complicity sits the commercial reality of many media organisations, that 
entertainment is more profitable than investigative news journalism. The resources that many 
commercial media enterprises put towards investigative journalism are decreasing. With the 
advertising dollar that traditionally drove the business model of news organisations rapidly 
fragmenting and shifting to other areas and platforms, the money available to invest in investigative 
reporting is shrinking. This is not to say that all journalists or mainstream media organisations are 
failing in this area, but there is clearly a problem that is manifesting through issues of changing 
media business models, and through a changing understanding of the institutional function of the 
media.  
Part of the change in business models is derived from the increased competition from online media 
platforms for the advertising dollar. There is also a certain competitiveness with online journalism 
which is seen to be less than professional and less than credible by many mainstream press 
journalists. As was pointed out above, there are grey areas around who actually can claim the title of 
journalist in the current legal terrain, but this extends also to the more sociocultural domain of the 
profession. As the perception of the mainstream press as complicit with big business and 
government interests has taken hold, we have seen a rise in the scrutiny of the press itself from 
citizen journalists and a variety of non-institutional actors. The recent release of the ‘Podesta emails’  
(a series of emails on deals involving Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager John Podesta, including 
deals done with media reporters) by Wikileaks, although controversial, nonetheless illuminates the 
relationship between those in government and journalists, with the influence on what journalists 
publish demonstrated as profound, and the pipelines of information between politicians and 
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journalists also revealed in some detail (Greenwald, 2016). As Benkler (2011) points out there are 
good and bad practices on either side of the fence – examples of great investigative journalism 
emerging from both the networked fourth estate and the mainstream media, as well as some 
unethical, inaccurate or lazy examples. He also points to the very strong interrelationship between 
the networked fourth estate and the more conventional press, with much criss-crossing of stories 
building back and forth between media sources and platforms.  
Into this mix is added the conversations of social media – the debates held through platforms such 
as Twitter and Facebook which may sometimes draw heavily on mainstream press stories, but also 
may be the generative source of waves of conversations in the public sphere. The press will often 
pick up on issues that have gone viral in social media, meaning that the agenda setting functions of 
the press have now become slightly more distributed. Those conversing via social media may not 
consider themselves to be citizen journalists even though the effect of the commentary carries some 
weight in the sphere of journalism and the public sphere. When considering the agenda setting 
possibilities from social media, the role of algorithms in selecting and amplifying trends must also be 
considered. Facebook’s recent experiments in curation by people and algorithms and then by fully 
automating through algorithms have been interesting to say the least (Thielman, 2016). 
Thus with regard to the model of society presented in the opening section of this paper, the role of 
the press as separate from the government and corporations and able to scrutinize each on behalf of 
citizens seems less plausible now. Although not a new dilemma many mainstream media 
organisations have become even more thoroughly commercial, less disinterested and impartial, and 
more part of an elite set of institutions in society that are linked rather than interrogatory. Keane 
(2013 np) points to the way Fairfax press in Australia and the New York Times in the US both 
suppressed leaked documents available to them, acting as gatekeepers who only reluctantly 
published information on the leaked cables from Wikileaks after intense pressure from other outlets 
who did publish. The New York Times took the cables to the US State Department to censor them 
first. According to Keane “The main reason the NYT allowed this was because it didn’t want to cut off 
the supply of the classified information from insiders that the paper thrives on – US Governments 
are happy to reveal plenty of secret information, as long as it serves their own political 
interests.”(Keane, 2013) He suggests this is one reason Snowden did not go to the NYT with his leaks.  
Journalists who wish to pursue investigative stories may find themselves without institutional 
supports.  The complacency highlighted by Oakes is probably no accident. Indeed Oakes points to an 
editorial in The Australian (a Murdoch daily) which suggested the new laws would have no impact on 
the practices of journalism and were necessary for national security (Oakes 2016:7). Some of its own 
reporters disagreed with this assessment, but it displays the nature of the relationship of editorial 
management within this powerful commercial organisation and government. The refusal to 
countenance debate or to ask critical questions of the policy led to a muted and insignificant debate 
on the issues.  
Where to from here? 
Investigative journalism in Australia is not dead, and the public conversation, although somewhat 
diminished and muted, still exists through the agency of the press in Australia, although it seems 
political discourse may come to rely on non-Press actors more and more. For whistleblowers the 
disincentives are strong, but as has recently been demonstrated, not insurmountable. The Guardian 
Australia at the time of writing, revealed information from a leak of 2000 documents from the Nauru 
Detention Centre. This has led to some public debate and at the time of writing further pressure on 
the government to change its practices around the indefinite detention and mistreatment of 
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refugees held on Nauru. It is too early to tell whether the government will actually respond and how 
much other media outlets will take up and broaden the public debate. Murdoch’s News Corp has 
initially reported with some articles on the leaks. The fact of the leak and the publication of the 
articles by The Guardian indicate that it is still possible to call the government to account on its 
practices via whistleblowing and publication in the mainstream media, as well as documentaries 
such as Chasing Asylum (2016). Whether section 35P of the ASIO Act or the Border Force Act will be 
used to track and punish the whistleblower or the Guardian Australia remains to be seen, and given 
that reporting on this may be illegal, may never be publicly disclosed.  
In this section we want to consider technological solutions to the incursions of metadata tracking, 
the role of the ‘networked fourth estate’ (Benkler 2011), the role of non-state, non-institutional 
actors such as Wikileaks , Anonymous and hackers more generally, as well as non-profit press outlets 
such as the Guardian Australia.  
Avoiding surveillance has become a much more complex proposition in this era of near ubiquitous 
and interlocking systems of tracking. There is much talk of encryption, and there are sites online 
such as The Centre for Investigative Journalism1 which offer manuals and tips and tools for training 
journalists in how to use encryption to try to secure their sources. At the very basic level, this would 
seem to be a minimum requirement and one which many journalists have not engaged with 
(Fernandez and Pearson 2015). However technological solutions run a number of risks. As the report 
into encryption released by the Harvard Berkman Centre (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, 
2016) on the ‘going dark’ debates suggests, there are many areas where, because of 
incompatibilities and gaps in the systems used on the internet, encryption is subject to failure. 
Metadata, by its very nature (as signals data for the transmission of content) does not lend itself to 
encryption. The process of masking metadata can fall apart at points of entry and exit into systems 
of masking.  Looking at a more political angle of encryption, 2016 also saw Apple trying to prevent 
the FBI from creating a backdoor into their phone encryption service (Apple, 2016). When the FBI 
could not convince Apple to do it, they got a German firm to do it for them. It didn’t seem to matter 
what the legal terrain was, and it also didn’t seem to matter what the technological hurdles were. As 
Gürses et al point out, searching for technological solutions to what is essentially a political problem 
is not going to ensure the democratic freedoms that the Fourth Estate has traditionally protected 
(Gürses et al., 2016). Nonetheless, having some skills in creating some barriers and protections 
around sources seems like the bare minimum a journalist should be able to provide. Many media 
organisations now have secure servers (The Guardian and The New York Times for instance) that can 
be found from their news sites, with instructions on how to download and use encryption tools such 
as Tor web browser technology.  
But literacy with encryption doesn’t overcome some of the problems of mainstream media 
organisations and their willingness to act upon information leaked to them. The rise of citizen 
journalism, WikiLeaks and other leak sites, and various Anonymous groups has introduced a new set 
of possibilities in the pursuit of accountability and transparency in a democratic society. It has been 
interesting to watch the trajectory of WikiLeaks as it finds a way to effectively carry out its mission of 
creating transparency in both government and corporate practices. As has been analysed in 
numerous academic articles (see for instance (Benkler, 2011; Goggin, 2013; Lidberg, 2013; 
Heemsbergen, 2015; de Zwart, 2013) WikiLeaks has enacted a variety of versions of ‘radical 
transparency’ which have involved the mainstream media in different kinds of relationships to the 
leaked materials.  
                                                          
1 The manual “Information Security for Journalists” is available at: http://tcij.org/node/1016  
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The mainstream media in its turn has developed a range of different attitudes towards sites such as 
WikiLeaks. While making good use of the materials leaked through this site, there has also been a 
tendency to either dismiss WikiLeaks as a site of journalism, or to outright denigrate it as an 
irresponsible or reckless site that endangers society through its leaks. This has included, as Benkler 
(2011) points out, a lot of misreporting and misrepresenting of what has actually been released by 
WikiLeaks. The Cablegate releases for instance were often reported as a reckless release of 
thousands of documents, whereas in fact only several hundred carefully redacted cables that were 
perceived to be in the public interest were initially released. Subsequent release of the bulk of the 
cables was a result of press actions. There appear to be a number of dynamics in play here. One is 
the mainstream journalists perhaps attempting to guard the territorial boundaries of their 
profession. Another is the desire of the mainstream press to distance itself from prosecutable 
offences by letting sites like WikiLeaks take the fall.  
WikiLeaks in its turn has clearly been working out the most effective ways to work in concert with 
mainstream media. Data dumps in themselves do not provide what it takes to get stories out – the 
distribution network and attention that mainstream outlets have is still a resource needed. But it is 
clear from the actions of Snowden, that some media organisations are seen to be more responsible 
and willing to act as government or corporate watchdog than others. Thus Snowden chose 
Greenwald and the Guardian as well as the Washington Post, but not the New York Times, which has 
been seen (along with the Post at times it has to be said) to be complicit with government and 
corporations more than as watchdog (de Zwart, 2013; Benkler, 2011, Harding, 2014, Greenwald, 
2014). Further, journalists still play a vital role in the interpretation, analysis and organization of such 
data. 
These new non-state, non-institutional actors can be seen as a catalyst for a media that may have 
grown complacent (Heemsbergen 2015). WikiLeaks is not the only player in this space of course. 
There have been other sites, such as Anonleaks, which more aggressively pursued transparency 
through hacking and was associated with the hacking groups of Anonymous. Rather than waiting for 
leaks to come to them, they took a more proactive stance to transparency, but as Heemsbergen 
points out, their actions didn’t necessarily align with democratic values. Nikitina (2012) points to 
hackers as complicated figures who are occasionally aligned with the goals of democratic 
transparency and often not. In analyzing their role in the current context she characterizes them as 
full of contradictions and ambiguous. Although some may act in the interests of freedom of 
expression (for instance), most seem to not conform to expected norms and conventions or to have 
well thought through politics that inform their actions. However we would be wise not to dismiss the 
hackers. She suggests that in other times and in other cultures the figure of the trickster has worked 
as a transitional agent – one that is disruptive and creates uncomfortable yet revealing insights into 
a culture in transition (Nikitina, 2012).  As Coleman’s work has illuminated, hackers are variously 
motivated, only some working within a political framework of understanding (Coleman, 2014) and 
yet they may be a crucial part of the media ecology as the networked affordances are picked up and 
used by all stakeholders in the system. As governments and corporations explore the possibilities of 
data collection and surveillance offered by the new systems, and as mainstream media become ever 
more enmeshed in commercial and competitive goals, the leaks sites and the actions of hackers are 
playing unstable yet crucial roles in the scrutiny of those in power. They could be seen to be the 
actions of citizens on their own behalf in the face of the failing mechanisms of the press.  
It is important to monitor the shifting pressure points created by government regulation: as national 
security concerns prompt tighter regulation of reporting of security activities and increased demands 
for access to metadata, government transparency and accountability appears to diminish. At the 
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same time recent work on whistleblowing has highlighted the importance of the insider in 
highlighting corporate, institutional or governmental wrongdoing (Lewis et al., 2014). This has led to 
enactment of enhanced whistleblower protection, provided that the whistleblower adheres to strict 
conditions. There are clear tensions here in terms of the values these pieces of legislation reflect. 
Meanwhile mainstream media is competing for ever diminishing public attention and dollars, and 
must be seen to be providing a value-added service. Some consideration needs to be given to the 
value of journalistic scrutiny in a democratic society to ensure that protections aimed at national 
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